We construct a matrix showing the share of the year 2000 population in every country that is descended from people in different source countries in the year 1500. Using this matrix, we analyze how post-1500 migration has influenced the level of GDP per capita and within-country income inequality in the world today. Indicators of early development such as early state history and the timing of transition to agriculture have much better predictive power for current GDP when one looks at the ancestors of the people who currently live in a country than when one considers the history on that country's territory, without adjusting for migration. Measures of the ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity of a country's current population do not predict income inequality as well as measures of the ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity of the current population's ancestors. An even better predictor of current inequality in a country is the variance of early development history of the country's inhabitants, with ethnic groups originating in regions having longer histories of agriculture and organized states tending to be at the upper end of a country's income distribution. However, high within-country variance of early development also predicts higher income per capita, holding constant the average level of early development.
despite their attempt (discussed below) to control for the European-descended population share.
In this paper we pursue the issue of migration's role in shaping the current economic landscape in a much more systematic fashion than previous literature. We construct a matrix detailing the year-1500 origins of the current population of almost every country in the world. (Throughout the paper, we use the term "migration" to refer to any movement of population across current nation borders, although we are cognizant that these movements included transport of slaves and forced relocation as well as voluntary migration.) We then use this matrix as a tool to examine how early development and the pattern of population movements across borders have impacted current income and inequality.
The most thorough previous work along these lines is in the papers by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (AJR) mentioned above, where they calculate the share of the population that is of European descent for 1900 and 1975. There are a number of conceptual and operational differences between our approach and theirs. Our estimates break down ancestor populations much more finely than "European" and "nonEuropean." This distinction is important both in the Americas, where there is great variation in the fraction of the population descended from Amerindians vs. Africans, and also in other regions, where important non-native populations are not descended from Europeans (consider the large Chinese-descended populations in Singapore and Malaysia, or Indian descendants in South Africa, Malaysia, and Fiji). Even when we use our matrix to construct a measure of the European population fraction, there are considerable differences between our data and AJR's. They use as their measure of the European population the fraction of people who are "white," while we also include an estimate of the fraction of European ancestors among mestizo populations, which is generally between 30 and 50%. In Mexico, for example, AJR estimate the European population in 1975 to be 15%, even though (in their data) there is an additional 55% of the population that is mestizo. Our estimate of the European share of ancestors for today's Mexicans is 29%. The AJR estimates are primarily based on data in McEvedy and Jones (1978) , which sometimes apply to whole regions, and occasionally involve extrapolation from as far in the past as 1800. Our data are based on a broader selection of more recent sources, including encyclopedias, government reports, and compilations by religious groups, which are summarized in Appendix A and Putterman (2006) . The correlation between our measure of the European fraction and the AJR measure is 0.89. 2 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the construction of our migration matrix, and then uses the matrix to lay out some of the 2 The largest differences occur in the Americas. For example, for the five Central American countries of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras, AJR use a uniform value of 20% European; our estimates range from 45% in Panama to 87% in Costa Rica. The largest outlier in the other direction is Trinidad and Tobago, which they list as 40% European and is only 7% in our measure. Here they seem to have erroneously counted all non-Africans as European, despite the presence of a large Asian population.
important facts regarding the population movements that have reshaped genetic and cultural landscapes in the world since 1500. We find that a significant minority of the world's countries have populations mainly descended from the people of other continents and that these countries themselves are quite demographically heterogeneous. In Section 2, we apply our migration matrix to analyze the determinants of current income. Using several measures of early development, we show that adjusting the data to reflect where people's ancestors came from improves the ability of measures of early social and technological development to predict current levels of income. In Section 3, we turn to the issue of inequality. We use the migration matrix to construct various measures of the heterogeneity of countries' populations in terms of the early development of the countries their ancestors came from, and show that these heterogeneity measures predict income inequality. We also show that ethnic groups originating in regions with higher levels of early development tend to be placed higher in a recipient country's income distribution. In Section 4, we examine the effect on current income of heterogeneity in early development. We find that, holding constant the average level of early development, heterogeneity in early development raises current income, a finding which we interpret as indicating spillovers of growth-promoting traits among national origin groups. Section 5 concludes.
Large-scale population movements since 1500
We use the year 1500 as a rough starting point for the era of European colonization of the other continents. It is well known that most contemporary residents of countries such as Australia and the United States are not descendants of their territory's inhabitants circa 1500, but of people who arrived subsequently from Europe, Africa, and other regions. But exactly what proportions of the ancestors of today's inhabitants of each country derive from what regions and from the territories of which present-day countries has not been systematically studied. Detailed genetic studies are thus far too sparse to provide the required data. Accordingly, we examined a wide array of secondary compilations to form the best available estimates of where the ancestors of the long-term residents of today's countries were living in 1500. Generally, these estimates have to work back from information presented in terms of ethnic groupings. For example, sources roughly agree on the proportion of Mexico's population considered to be mestizo, that is having both Spanish and indigenous ancestors, on the proportion having exclusively Spanish ancestors, on the proportion exclusively indigenous, and on the proportion descended from migrants from other countries. There is similar agreement about the proportion of Haitians descended from African slaves, the proportion of people of (east) Indian origin in Guyana, the proportion of "mixed" and "Asian" people in South Africa, and so on. Such information plus information helpful to the decomposition of mixed categories-for instance, an archive on the slave trade permitting estimates to be made of the proportion of slaves in a given region who originated from a certain part of Africa identifiable with certain present-day countries-makes possible estimates of the proportion of a current population's ancestors likely to have lived in 1500 in the territory of other specific contemporary countries.
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Using these methods, a matrix of migration since 1500 was constructed. It has 165 complete rows, each for a present-day country, the same number of complete columns, representing the same countries, and its entries are the proportion of long-term residents' ancestors estimated to have lived in each source country in 1500, summing to one. Appendix A briefly describes our sources and methods, with the appendices of Putterman (2006) providing further details including written summaries of the factors behind the estimate for each row.
The principal diagonal of the matrix provides a quick indication of differences in the degree to which countries are now populated by the ancestors of their historical populations. The diagonal entries for China and Ethiopia (with shares below half a percent being ignored) are 1.0, while the corresponding entries for Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti are 0.0 and that of Paraguay is close to 0.5. In some cases, the diagonal entry may give a misleading impression without further analysis; for example, the diagonal entry for Botswana is 0.31 because only 31% of Botswanans' ancestors are estimated to have lived in present-day Botswana in 1500, but another 67% were Africans who migrated to Botswana from what is now neighboring South Africa in the 17 th and 18 th centuries. (Note that the use of 1500 as our starting point means that the ancestors of white South Africans are attributed to Netherlands and other European countries, not South Africa.)
Figures 1a and 1b are histograms of the proportion of countries and people, respectively, falling into decile bands with respect to the proportion of the current people's ancestors residing in the same or an immediate neighboring country in 1500. The figures show bimodal distributions, with 11.5% of countries having 0 to 10% indigenous or near-indigenous ancestry and 67.9% of countries having 90 to 100% such ancestry. Altogether, 80.1% of the world's people (excluding those in the smallest countries, which are not covered) live in countries that are more than 90% indigenous in population, while 10.1% live in countries that are less than 30% indigenous, with the rest (dominated by Central America, the Andes, and Malaysia) falling in between.
The compositions of non-indigenous populations are also of interest. The populations of Australia, New Zealand and Canada are overwhelmingly of European origin, while Central American and Andean countries have both large Amerindian and substantial European-descended populations, and Caribbean countries and Brazil have substantial African-descended populations. Guyana, Fiji, Malaysia and Singapore are among those countries with substantial minorities descended from South Asians, while Malaysia and Singapore also have large Chinese-descended populations. We illustrate differences both in the proportions of people of non-local descent and in the composition of those people by means of Map 1. Country shading indicates the proportion of the population not descended from residents of the same or immediate neighboring countries. Pie charts, drawn for thirteen macro-regions, show the average proportions descended from European migrants, from migrants (or slaves) from Africa, and from migrants from other regions, as well as the proportion descended from people of the same region. 4 In terms of territory, about half the world's land mass (excluding Greenland and Antarctica), comprising almost all of Africa, Europe and Asia, is in countries with almost entirely indigenous populations (shown in black), while about a third has less than 20% indigenous inhabitants, and the remainder, dominated by Central America, the Andes and Malaysia, falls somewhere in between. The heterogeneity of regions in the Americas and Australia/New Zealand is highlighted by the pie charts, showing strong European dominance in Australia/New Zealand, the U.S., Canada, and eastern South America, stronger indigenous presence in the Andes, and strong African representation in the Caribbean. We consider the effects of this heterogeneity in Section 3.
While we are mostly interested in using the migration matrix to better understand the determinants of long-run economic performance in countries as presently populated, the versatility of the data can be illustrated by using it to calculate the number of descendants of populations that lived five centuries ago and to see how they've fared. Given data on country populations in 2000, the matrix will tell total number of people today who are descended from each 1500 source country, and where on the globe they are to be found. For instance, using 2000 population figures from Penn World Tables 6.2 for the matrix's 165 countries, we find that there were 31.6 million descendants of 1500's Irish alive at the turn of the millennium, of whom 11.8% lived in Ireland itself, 76.2% in the U.S., 1.0% in the U.K. and 5.2% in Australia. According to the matrix and the sources it's based on, there are essentially no descendants of the indigenous population of Hispaniola (today's Haiti and Dominican Republic), since the Arawak people who lived there died out during the early decades of colonial rule due to disease and the effects of enslavement.
Combining the information in the matrix with population data for the years 1500 and 2000 yields a number of interesting insights. Because population data for 1500 are very noisy, particularly at the country level, we confine our analysis to looking at 11 large regions (data are from McEvedy and Jones, 1978) . The first two columns of Table  1 list the estimated population of each region in 1500 and 2000. The third column shows the increase in total population over the 500 year period. The primary determinant of this increase in density is the level of economic development in 1500. Europe, East Asia, and South Asia, which were highly developed, had the smallest increases in density. The U.S. and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the Caribbean, which were relatively lightly populated, lacked urban centers, and were still home to many pre-agricultural societies in 1500, had the largest increases. 5 The next three columns of the table use the matrix to track the relationship between ancestor and descendant populations. In column 4, we calculate the number of descendants per capita for each region in 1500, which can be thought of as a kind of "genetic success" quotient. The lowest values of this measure are in the Caribbean and Australia and New Zealand, where native populations were largely displaced. by European colonizers. Among the regions that were relatively developed in 1500, Europe, not surprisingly, has the highest number of descendants per capita. However, Europe's figure is exceeded by those for Mexico and Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, and above all Southeast Asia, which were regions that were relatively poor (and thus somewhat less densely populated) in 1500 but in which the native population was either not entirely or hardly at all displaced by migrants. Column 5 calculates the fraction of the current regional population that is descended from the region's own 1500 ancestors. This ranges from a zero for the Caribbean to almost one for South Asia and East Asia. Finally, column 6 shows the fraction of descendants of the 1500 population that still live in the same region. Disregarding the case of the Caribbean, this is lowest for Europe, which has retained only 66 percent of its descendants. The second largest exporter of people, by this measure, is sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Mexico and Central America. In every other region, there has been little significant export of population.
Reassessing the Effects of Early Economic Development
In the introduction, we noted that studies including Olsson (2004, 2005) , Comin, Easterly, and Gong (2006) and Chanda and Putterman (2006) find strong correlations between measures of early agricultural, technological, or political development and current levels of economic development, but that these studies make relatively ad hoc adjustments, if any, to account for the large population movements on which this paper focuses. The new migration matrix puts us in a position to remedy these shortcomings and thereby put the theory that very early development persists in its effects on economic outcomes to a more stringent test.
We use two measures of early development. The first is an index of state history called statehist. The index takes into account whether what is now a country had present a supra-tribal government, the geographic scope of that government, and whether that government was indigenous or by an outside power. The version used by us, as in Putterman (2006, 2007) , considers state history for the fifteen centuries to 1500, and discounts the past, reducing the weight on each half century before 1451-1500 by an additional 5%. Let s it be the state history variable in country i for the 50 year period t. s it ranges between 0 and 50 by definition, being 0 if there was no supra-tribal state, 50 if there was a home-based supra-tribal state covering most of the present-day country's territory, 25 if there was supra-tribal rule over that territory by a foreign power, and taking values ranging from 15 (7.5) to 37.5 (18.75) for home-(foreign-) based states covering between 10 and 50% of the present-day territory or when several small states co-exist on that territory. statehist is computed by taking the discounted sum of the state history variables over the thirty half centuries and normalizing it to be between 0 and 1 (by dividing it by the maximum achievable, i.e. the statehist value of a country that had s it = 50 in each period). In a formula: Our second measure of early development, agyears, is the number of millennia since a country transitioned from hunting and gathering to agriculture. Unlike a similar measure used by Hibbs and Olsson, which had values for nine macro regions, these data are based on individual country information augmented by extrapolation to fill gaps within regions. The data were assembled by Putterman with Trainor (2006) by consulting region-and country-specific as well as wider-ranging studies on the transition to agriculture, such as MacNeish (1991) and Smith (1995) . The variable agyears is simply the number of years prior to 2000, in thousands, since a significant number of people in an area within the country's present borders are believed to have met most of their food needs from cultivated foods. The highest value, 10.5, occurs for four Fertile Crescent countries (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) followed closely by Iraq and Turkey (10), Iran (9.5), China (9) and India (8.5). Near the middle of the pack are countries like Belarus (4.5), Ecuador (4), Ivory Coast (3.5) and Congo (3). At the bottom are countries like Haiti and Jamaica (1) which received crop-growing immigrants from the American mainland only a few hundred years before Columbus, New Zealand (0.8), which obtained agriculture late in the Austronesian expansion, and Cape Verde (0.5), Australia (0.4) and others in which agriculture arrived for the first time with European colonists.
7 It is worth noting that while statehist measures a stock of experience with state-level organization that takes into account, for example, set-backs like the disappearance, break-up, or annexation of an existing state by a neighboring empire, agyears simply measures the time elapsed since agriculture's founding in the country, with no attempt to gauge temporal changes in the kind, intensity, or prevalence of farming within the country's territory. 8 For each of these explanatory variables, we conduct a series of tests both with the variable in its original form and with a version adjusted to account for migration. Supposing the "early developmental advantages" proxied by statehist and agyears to be something that migrants bring with them to their new country, the adjusted variables measure the average level of such advantages in a present-day country as the weighted average of statehist or agyears in the countries of ancestry, with weights equal to population shares. For instance, ancestry-adjusted statehist for Botswana is simply 0.312 times the statehist value for Botswana plus 0.673 times statehist for South Africa (referring to the people in South Africa in that year, not those there presently) plus weights of 0.005 each times the statehist values of France, Germany and the Netherlands (the ancestral homes of Botswana's small Afrikaner population). Our dependent variable is the log of year 2000 per capita income. Table 2 shows our results. Each regression includes the unadjusted form of our early development measure, the adjusted form, or both. Not surprisingly, given previous work, the tests suggest significant predictive power for the unadjusted variables. However, for both measures of early development, adjusting for migration produces a very large increase in explanatory power. In the case of statehist, the R 2 goes from .06 to .22, while in the case of agyears it goes from .09 to .24. The coefficients on the measures of early development are also much larger using the adjusted than the unadjusted values. In the third and sixth columns of the table we run "horse race" regressions including both the adjusted and unadjusted measures of early development. We find that the coefficients on the adjusted measures retain their significance and become larger while the coefficients on the unadjusted measures become negative and significant.
In the remainder of Table 2 we present tests of the robustness of our findings. We start by constructing measures of statehist and agyears that are adjusted in the spirit of Olsson (2004, 2005) by simply assigning to four countries (the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia) the statehist and agyears values of the United Kingdom.
9 As the table shows, these adjusted versions perform better than the unadjusted ones, but not nearly as well as the versions we construct using the migration matrix. When we run "horserace" regressions including statehist and agyears adjusted using both our matrix and the Hibbs-Olsson method (columns 8 and 10), the coefficients on the matrix-adjusted measures rise in size and significance, while the coefficient on the Hibb-Olsson adjusted measures become negative and significant.
We then construct a series of other measures from out matrix. The first is the fraction of the population made up of "natives" (that is, people whose ancestors lived there in 1500). We include this alongside our measures of adjusted statehist and agyears in order to check that we are not just picking up the fact that there is a correlation between the share of immigrants in a country and the source of those immigrants. In a similar spirit we construct a measure of the fraction of the descendants of each country's people in 1500 who live in that country today, which we call "retained population." For example, only 40.3% of those descended from the 1500 population of what's now the United Kingdom live there today, whereas 97.4% of Indian descendants still live in India.
10 Neither of these measures eliminates the statistical significance of our adjusted history measures. Retained population enters our regression with a negative sign and is marginally significant, suggesting either that the venting of surplus population may have aided growth or that characteristics that led to countries being able to implant their population abroad also led them to be richer today.
Our second set of robustness checks examines whether our adjusted measures of statehist and agyears are simply proxying for a large European population or for speaking a European language. In columns 13-16 we include the fraction of the population descended from 1500 inhabitants of European countries, a variable that we create using the matrix. Not surprisingly, given that most of the world's highest income countries are either in Europe or mainly populated by persons of European descent, the European descent variable comes in very significantly. By itself, it explains 41 percent of the variance in the log of GDP per capita. However, even controlling for this variable, our adjusted measures of state history and agriculture are quite significant (t-statistics above 4) and their magnitude falls by only a quarter in comparison with the regressions that don't control for the fraction European. In columns 16-18, we include the fraction of the population speaking one of five European languages (English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian), which is used by Hall and Jones (1999) as an instrument for "social infrastructure." This variable explains only 14 percent of the variation in log of income per capita by itself, and has a negligible effect on the magnitude and significance of our measures of early development.
The finding that adjusting for migration improves the predictive power of measures of early development is consistent with the hypothesis that early technological and social development conferred human capabilities that continued to affect economic performance into the industrial era. These findings suggest that especially Europeans and to some extent East and South Asians carried their historically-bequeathed human capital with them to the Americas, Australia, Malaysia, and elsewhere. They are also consistent with the possibility that the historically-bequeathed human capital disadvantage of Africans has played out in new homes such as Jamaica and Haiti, although not ruling out the possibility that their arrival in these places as slaves rather than as migrants may also have played a role. By contrast, the findings of Table 2 cast doubt on a more geographically oriented theory of the importance of early development, which would hold that places that developed early did so because they had favorable climates, and that these favorable climates are responsible for their economic advantage today.
The other finding of Table 2 that is worth pointing out is that, once one adjusts for migration, the explanatory power of measures of early development is relatively high. Even in their unadjusted form, regressions like these suggested that long-term factors play a surprisingly large role in current economic outcomes. The results using adjusted early development suggest that this is all the more true.
Source Region and Current Region Regressions
Although our interest in most of this paper is in how the migration matrix can be used to map data on place-specific early development into a measure of early development appropriate to a country's current population, the matrix can also be used to infer characteristics of the source countries based only on current data. More specifically, if we assume that emigrants from a particular region share some characteristics that affect the income of countries to which they have migrated, then we can back out these characteristics by looking at data on current outcomes and migration patterns.
To pursue this idea we regress log GDP per capita in 2000 on the fraction of the current population that comes from each of the 11 regions defined previously for the exercises of Table 1 . We call the coefficients from this regression, shown in column (1) of Table 3 , "source region coefficients." Loosely speaking, they measure how having a country's population composed of people from a particular region can be expected to affect GDP per capita. For example, the source region coefficient for Europe is 2.34, while that for sub Saharan Africa is zero, since this is the omitted category. Thus these coefficients say that moving 10% of a country's population from European to African origin would be expected to lower ln(GDP) by .234 points.
11
The second column of Table 3 shows a more conventional regression of the log of GDP per capita in the year 2000 on dummies for the region in which the country is located (as in the first column, sub-Saharan Africa is the omitted region). We call these "current region coefficients." The R 2 of the regression with current region dummies is about .05 lower than the R 2 of the regression with source region shares. It is also interesting to compare the coefficients on the source and current regions. There is a strong tendency for regions that are rich to also have large values for their source region coefficients. For example, among the six source regions that account for 97% of the world's population (in size order: East Asia, South Asia, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and North Africa/West and Central Asia) the magnitudes of the coefficients are very similar, with the single exception of South Asia. This similarity of coefficients in the two regressions is not much of a surprise, given the fact, discussed above, that most countries are populated primarily by people whose ancestors lived in that same country 500 years ago. In column (3) of Table 3 , we regress log income in 2000 on both the source region and current region measures. The R 2 is somewhat higher than in the first two columns, indicating that source regions are not simply proxying for current regions, or vice versa. F-tests easily reject the null hypotheses that either the coefficients on source region or on current region are zero. Interestingly, the source region coefficients on Europe and East Asia remain positive, while the current region coefficients become negative, suggesting that having population from these regions, rather than being located in them, is what tends to make countries rich.
Population Heterogeneity and Income Inequality
The finding that current income is influenced by the early development of a country's people, rather than of the place itself, provides evidence against some theories of why early development is important, but leaves many others viable. Early development may matter for income today because of the persistence of institutions (among people, rather than places), because of cultural factors that migrants brought with them, because of long-term persistence in human capital, or because of genetic factors that are related to the amount of time since a population group began its transition to agriculture (Galor and Moav, 2007) .
Many of the theories that explain the importance of early development in determining the level of income at the national level would also support the implication that heterogeneity in the early development of a country's population should raise the level of income inequality. For example, if experience living in settled agricultural societies conveys to individuals some cultural characteristics that are economically advantageous in the context of an industrial society, and if these characteristics have a high degree of persistence over generations, then a society in which individuals come from heterogeneous backgrounds in terms their families' economic history should ceteris paribus be more unequal. (Following this logic, a country's heterogeneity in early development might also affect the country's average level of income. We examine this question further below).
We pursue three different approaches to examining the determinants of withincountry income inequality. We begin by showing that heterogeneity in the historical level of development of country's residents predicts the level of income inequality in a cross-country regression. Second, we construct measures of population heterogeneity based both on the current ethnic and linguistic groupings and on the ethnic and linguistic differences among the sources of a country's current population. We show that allowing for these other measures of heterogeneity does not reduce the importance of heterogeneity in historical development as a predictor of current inequality. Finally, we pursue an implication of these findings by asking whether, within a country, people originating from countries that had characteristics predictive of low national income are in fact found to be lower in the income distribution.
Historical Determinants of Current Inequality
We create two measures of the heterogeneity of the early development of a country's population, using the same state history and history of agriculture variables examined above. The first is the weighted variance of the state history of the countries that contributed to a given country's current population, where the weights are the fractions of that source country's descendants in current population. The second is a similar construction for the years of agricultural history. There is a broad range in the heterogeneity of agyears and statehist. The mean of the within-country standard deviation of agyears is .756, and the standard deviation across countries is .705. The mean within-country standard deviation of statehist is .095, and the standard deviation across countries is .088.
In this exercise our dependent variable is the gini coefficient in 1991 or the closest year available (using the high quality sample of Deininger and Squire, 1996) . We experiment with including as additional controls the level of the adjusted early development measure as well as the log of current income. The results are show in the first four columns of Table 4 .
Our finding is that heterogeneity in the early development experience of the ancestors of a country's population is significantly related to current inequality. To give a feel for the size of the coefficients, we look at the case of agyears. The standard deviation of agyears in Brazil is 1.894 millennia. By contrast, in countries which have essentially no in-migration, such as Japan, the standard deviation is zero. Applying the regression coefficient of .0656 from the fourth column of Table 3, this would say that variation in early development in Brazil would be expected to raise the gini there by .12, which is certainly an economically significant amount. Since Brazil's gini was .60 and Japan's .35, the exercise suggests that about half of the difference in inequality between the two countries may be attributable to the difference in the heterogeneity of their populations' early development experiences.
We can perform a similar exercise using the source region coefficients estimated in Table 3 . Recall that, unlike the exercise just conducted using statehist and agyears, the estimation of source region coefficients does not require us to know anything about technology or institutions several millennia into the past. The estimates in column (1) of Table 3 simply say that on average, countries with populations originating in certain regions are richer than those with populations originating in other regions. Now we ask whether variation in the source regions of a country's population predicts within-country inequality. Specifically, we create a measure of the weighted standard deviation of the source region coefficients of a country's population, where the weights are the fractions of the population originating in each of the 11 regions. This is a measure of the heterogeneity of a country's population in terms of the source region coefficients of its people's ancestors. For example the Philippines and Mexico have very similar average source region coefficients (.803 and .851, respectively), but differ in the standard deviations of their source region coefficients. In the Philippines, the standard deviation is zero, since the population is entirely composed of people from the Southeast Asia region. In Mexico, the standard deviation of the source region coefficients is 0.958, reflecting a composition of 70% people from the region of Mexico and Central America (source region coefficient 0.234) and 29% from Europe (source region coefficient 2.34). The highest values of the standard deviation of the source region coefficient are found in Canada (5.94), the U.S. (5.90), Belize (2.93), Guatemala (1.82), New Zealand (1.76), and Cape Verde (1.13).
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 we present regressions of the gini coefficient on the standard deviation of the source region coefficients, with and without controlling for the average level of the source region coefficient. As expected, the standard deviation of source region significantly positively affects the gini. For example, using the coefficient in column (6) of the table, .0309, the variation in source region coefficients among the population of Brazil would raise the gini coefficient .031 points relative to a country with completely homogenous population in terms of source region coefficient.
Other Measures of Heterogeneity
Our finding in the last section was that heterogeneity of a country's migrants with respect to measures of early development (statehist and agyears) contributes to current income inequality. Similarly, heterogeneity of migrants with respect to source region coefficients, which we interpret as an indirect measure of early development, contributes to current inequality. We now pursue the question of whether heterogeneity in the background of migrants more generally may affect the level of income inequality in a country. If this were the case, then in our previous findings early development might simply be proxying for more general heterogeneity. To address this issue, we examine two standard measures of heterogeneity as well as two new measures created using the matrix, and we compare the predictive power of these measures to each other and to the measures that incorporate early development.
Our theory is that a country made up of people who are similar in terms of culture, language, religion, skin color, or similar attributes will ceteris paribus have lower inequality. This could take place through a number of different channels. Populations that are similar in the dimensions just listed may be more likely to intermarry and mix socially than populations that are diverse. This mixing could by itself reduce any inequality in the groups' initial endowments, and would also likely to be associated with an absence of institutions that might magnify ethnic, racial, or economic distinctions.
Countries in which people feel a strong sense of kinship with other citizens might also be expected to more actively redistribute income or promote economic mobility.
The first heterogeneity measure we use is ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al (2003) . This is the probability that two randomly selected individuals will belong to the same ethnic group. Alesina et al. find that higher ethnic fractionalization is robustly correlated with poor government performance on a variety of dimensions.
We create a second measure of fractionalization using the data in the matrix, which we call "historic fractionalization." This is
where w i is the fraction of a country's ancestors coming from country i. Unlike the ethnic fractionalization index, the historic fractionalization index does not take into account ethnic groups composed of people who came from several source countries, such as African Americans, but instead differentiates among, for example, Ghanaian, Senegalese, Angolan, and other ancestors of current residents of the United States (The historical fractionalization index also has the odd property that it includes heterogeneity within individuals. For example a country composed entirely of people who are each half Italian and half Irish will have a fractionalization value of 0.5). As Alesina et al. point out, individual self-identification with ethnic groups can change as result of economic, social or political forces. Thus ethnicity has a significant endogenous component, when one looks over spans of centuries, that is absent in the case of historical fractionalization. Factors such as institutions may directly affect the perception of the degree of ethnic heterogeneity within a county.
Ethnic and historical fractionalization are almost uncorrelated (correlation coefficient .16). In particular, a large number of African countries have values of ethnic fractionalization near one but historical fractionalization near zero. The reason is that in these countries there is fractionalization based on tribal affiliation that is unrelated to the movement of people over current international borders over the last 500 years. There are also several countries populated by immigrants (Haiti, Jamaica, Argentina, Israel, the United States) that have a high historic fractionalization because they contain immigrants from many different countries, but a low level of ethnic fractionalization because immigrant groups from similar countries are viewed has having a single ethnicity.
The third measure of heterogeneity we use is "cultural diversity" as constructed by Fearon (2003) . Fearon's measure is similar in spirit to the ethnic heterogeneity measure described above, but goes further in making an additional adjustment for different degrees of dissimilarity among the ethnic groups in a country's population. The specific measure of dissimilarity used is based on the language that people speak. Fearon constructs measures of linguistic distance among all currently spoken languages (we describe a very similar methodology below). His measure of cultural diversity is then one minus the average degree of linguistic proximity among two randomly drawn individuals in the population. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (forthcoming), using a similar measure, find that higher linguistic heterogeneity predicts a lower degree of government income redistribution.
Our final measure of heterogeneity is similar in approach to Fearon's, but instead of using the language that a country's residents speak today, we use data on the languages spoken in the countries inhabited by their ancestors in 1500, according to our matrix. Differences in language may directly impede mixing of people from different source countries. In addition, linguistic closeness may well be proxying for other dimensions of culture (such as religion) that could have similar impacts on the degree of mixing among a country's constituent populations and/or the openness of institutions.
12 For these reasons, historical diversity in languages of a country's ancestors may have an impact on inequality that lasts long after the residents of a country have come to speak the same language.
Our starting point in creating a measure of linguistic heterogeneity among a country's ancestor population is to determine the language spoken by people arriving from each potential source country. For each of the 165 countries in our matrix, we do our best to choose the dominant or most prevalent language of the country's population in the year 1500 (see Appendix B at http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman/ ). Whenever possible, we use historical summaries to determine what was the largest ethnic group in the year 1500, and the language spoken by that group at that time. In some cases where historical information was not available, we use the current day (indigenous) language of the largest current indigenous group. Obviously our method is flawed in ignoring any heterogeneity of languages spoken within a source country. This problem is especially acute because our definition of "country" uses current borders, which are often unrelated to linguistic or cultural fault lines at the time that people emigrated. Thus, for example, immigrants from Sicily and Venice, who would not have been able to understand each other, are treated at having spoken the same language. However, as much of the heterogeneity that we measure relates to gross differences in language among the sources of a country's population (such as Amerindians vs. Europeans), our hope is this mis-measurement will not be too severe.
We then construct a matrix of linguistic distance among each pair of source country languages. The starting point for linguistic distance is a tree showing the relations among all current and known past languages (Gordon, 2005) . Every language can be characterized by its family (such as Indo-European or Uralic), and then a series of "nodes," representing the branching points of the language tree, ending in the language itself. For example, the full tree of Spanish is Indo-European, Italic, Romance, ItaloWestern, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian, Spanish. Any two languages in the same family can be connected by going up and then down a certain number of nodes. For example, the tree for Italian is common with Spanish through Italo-Western, and is then followed by Italo-Dalmation, Italian. Italian and Spanish thus have four nodes in common. We measure the distance between any pair of languages as 13 ( ) , # of common nodes between and 1 1 # of nodes for langauge # of nodes for language 2
Languages from different families have no nodes in common, and so the distance between them is one. The parameter λ is assumed to be between zero and one, implying that earlier common nodes have a larger weight in the distance function than later ones. In practice, we follow Fearon in assuming 0.5 λ = .
14 Finally, we combine our linguistic distance measure with the information on source countries in the matrix. Let L be the matrix of linguistic distances and A be the matrix with current countries as rows and source countries as columns. Our new measure, which we call "historical linguistic heterogeneity," is the diagonal of ALA'. Table 5 presents regressions of income inequality, as measured by the gini coefficient, on our various measures of heterogeneity. The first four columns compare the four measures of heterogeneity described above. Controlling for current income, neither of the two measures based on the current population, ethnic fractionalization and cultural (linguistic) diversity, is statistically significant. By contrast, the two variables that use the matrix to measure historical heterogeneity, historical fractionalization and historical linguistic fractionalization, enter very significantly with the expected positive sign. Of the two, the latter, which takes into account degrees of dissimilarly based on linguistic distance, does a better job; along with income, it explains 25% of the variation in the gini coefficient. Much of the superior predictive power of the measures based on historical variation as compared to current variation is driven by Latin America which in terms of language currently spoken does not look very heterogeneous, but does look heterogeneous in terms of historic languages. It is remarkable to see how much better distance among the languages spoken by people's ancestors predicts inequalities today than does distance among the languages spoken by those people themselves. Patterns of social differentiation which arose during the encounters of people from different continents appear to show persistence even after extensive intermixing and linguistic homogenization.
The next four columns of Table 5 repeat these regressions, controlling for the mean and standard deviation of the state history measures, as in columns 1 and 2 of Table  4 . 15 The somewhat surprising finding here is that variation in terms of state history 13 The only difference between our method and Fearon's is that in the denominator he uses 15, which is the maximum number of nodes for any language. 14 Experimenting with value of lambda in the range 0.25-0.75 had very little effect on the results shown below. 15 To save space, we don't report parallel exercises using the standard deviation of agyears. In Section 3.3, we also focus on statehist.. Tables 3 and 4 show that statehist and agyears have similar explanatory power, dominates the other forms of heterogeneity that we examine. None of the other four measures of heterogeneity comes close to statistical significance. Variation in early development among a country's people is far more important than more standard forms of heterogeneity (in language or ethnicity) as an explanation for inequality. Similarly, variation in the linguistic background of a country's ancestors, despite its surprising predictive power relative to that of present languages spoken, is not important once one controls for variation in early development.
Source Country Early Development as a Determinant of Relative Income
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that heterogeneity in the historical background of a country's residents is correlated with income inequality today. A number of mechanisms could produce such a correlation. One simple theory is that when people with high and low statehist are mixed together, the high statehist people have some advantage which leads them to percolate up to the top of the income distribution, and then there is enough persistence that their descendants are still there hundreds of years later. A second theory is that situations in which high and low statehist people are mixed together tended to occur in cases of colonialization and/or slavery, and that in these circumstances high statehist people were able to create institutions that led groups at the top of the income distribution to remain there. We do not propose to test these theories against each other. Instead we test an auxiliary prediction that follows from either of them: specifically, in countries with a high standard deviation of statehist, it is the ethnic groups that come from high statehist countries that tend to be at the top of the income distribution. Confirming this prediction would give us additional confidence that the link between the standard deviations of statehist and the current level of inequality is not spurious.
To test this prediction, we looked for accounts of socio-economic heterogeneity by country or region of ancestral origin in the ten countries in our sample having the highest standard deviation of statehist. It is in countries where statehist is highly variable where we would be most likely to find differences in outcomes among nationality groups with different values of statehist. The countries are listed in Table 6 . Not surprisingly, all are former colonies, seven of them in the Americas. Of the latter, three are in Central America, three in South America, and one in the Caribbean. We also list in Table 6 the United States, which has the 16 th highest standard deviation of statehist in the sample, and is of particular interest due to its size, economic importance, and good data availability.
For each country in the table we first show the breakdown of the population in terms of origin countries or groups of similar countries, according to the matrix. We then show the weighted average value of statehist for each origin country or group. The next three columns are based on information about the current ethnic breakdown in the country. Ethnic groups as currently identified sometimes correspond to individual origin and we accord slight priority to statehist because of its more nuanced tracking of 1500 years of social history (see our discussion comparing the two measures in Section 2).
groups, but are often combinations, frequently labeled mestizo, mulatto or Creole. For each current ethnic group, we then present estimates of average statehist and the relative value of current income, listed as high, middle and low or high, upper middle, lower middle, and low. To estimate statehist for a mixed ethnic group we use the assumptions underlying the matrix that relate mixed groups to source populations. For example, the group termed "colored" in South Africa is assumed to have half of its ancestors coming in equal proportions from five European countries (England, Portugal, and Afrikaner source countries Netherlands, France and Germany) and the other half in unequal proportions from South Africa itself (35%), India (10%) and Indonesia (5%). These assumptions are reported in the region appendices describing the construction of the matrix.
Leaving details to Appendix C 16 , we note immediately that the ordering of statehist values and the ordering of socio-economic status in Table 6 has at least some correspondence in every country. For nine of the eleven countries listed-Fiji, Cape Verde, Guyana, Paraguay, Panama, South Africa, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Venezuela-the socio-economic ordering perfectly dovetails with that of statehist values. In two countries-Trinidad and Tobago and the United States-there are discrepancies in the orderings of Asians and "Whites," with Chinese and (S. Asian) Indians having lower incomes than Whites in the first country despite having higher statehist, while Asians in general have higher incomes than Whites in the U.S. despite lower average statehist. For the U.S., there is a further discrepancy in that "Black" Americans have lower average incomes than American Indians and Alaska Natives, despite having somewhat higher average statehist values. While no statistical significance should be attached to the counts just mentioned, since the categorizations are quite broad and require some judgments to be made, the general pattern clearly supports the expectation.
A few patterns are noteworthy. Paraguay and El Salvador are representative of the many Latin American countries in which the main identifiable groupings, listed in order of both socio-economic status and of average statehist, are European, mestizo, and Amerindian. Like other countries in or bordering the Caribbean, three of the represented countries-Panama, Nicaragua and Venezuela-add a group of largely African descent to this tri-partite pattern. In each of the latter countries, the White group remains on top and the Amerindian group on the bottom. The Black group, with higher statehist than the Amerindians, 17 is variously found on approximate par with the mestizos (Nicaragua), between the mestizo and Amerindian groups (Panama), or sharing the bottom rung with the Amerindians (Venezuela).
In two of the other represented countries of the Americas-Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago-there are substantial populations of South Asian origin. The socioeconomic positioning of this group is lower than predicted by their average statehist. This result, contradicting our general hypothesis, seems related to the economic hard times on which South Asia itself had fallen by the 19 th Century and the manner in which millions were brought from that region to the Caribbean to work in indentured servitude after Britain outlawed slavery.
Of the two African countries represented in Table 6 , Cape Verde began as a Portuguese plantation economy employing slaves brought from the African mainland. At the time of the country's independence from Portugal, in 1975, the society was described as being stratified along color lines, with people of darker complexion usually found in the lower class and people of lighter complexion constituting the "bourgeoisie" (Meintel, 1984; Lobban, 1995) . The correlation between complexion and socioeconomic class is consistent with our proposed explanation of the correlation between standard deviation of statehist and the gini coefficient seen in Table 4 . In South Africa, the major population categories are Black African, White, "colored" (with both European and either African, Indian, or Malay ancestors), and Indian or Asian. The socio-economic standings of these groups today remains heavily influenced by the history of European settlement and subordination of the local population, and partly as a result, the average incomes for those in the four groupings are ordered exactly in accord with the ordering of average statehist.
The only case in Table 6 not located in the Americas or Africa is Fiji, whose population is classified by government statisticians as indigenous (55.0%), Indian (41.0%) and Other (mainly European and Chinese, 4.0%). Average household incomes per adult in the three groups are ordered identically to average statehist values. Although the reported income gap between the Indian and native Fijian populations is far smaller than the difference in statehist, the government statisticians comment that the incomes of Indo-Fijians are probably undercounted, since much of it comes from private business activities likely to be underreported.
Turning finally to the U.S., the Census Bureau reports a breakdown of the population into White non-Hispanic, Hispanic any race, Black, Asian, American Indian and Alaska Native, and other small categories. These groups' reported median incomes have the same ordering as their average statehist values, with the exception of the higher Asian than White income and the higher American Indian than Black income. The simple correlation between the five statehist and the five income values, with equal weighting on all observations, is 0.747.
On balance, the evidence from the ten countries with the highest internal variation of statehist and from the sixteenth-ranking United States appears to support the idea that correlation between within-country differences in income and corresponding differences in the early development indicator statehist at least partially account for the predictive power of the standard deviation of statehist in the Table 4 regressions. Indeed, in this section we have found within countries (as the previous section found between countries) that there is considerable persistence and reproduction of income differences which appears to reflect social differences dating back up to half a millennium. To be sure, in the majority of cases just discussed differences in societal capabilities during the era of European expansion played themselves out to a considerable degree in the form of outright dominance of some over others, including appropriation of land, control of government and monopoly of armed force, and involuntary movement of millions of people between macro-regions to meet the conquering population's labor demands. How persistent early differences would have proven to be in the absence of the exercise of raw power is a question that goes beyond the scope of our paper. The point for present purposes is that as history has in fact unfolded, such differences have been remarkably persistent.
Population Heterogeneity and Income Levels
As a final exercise, we discuss the relationship between heterogeneity in the early development history of a country's population and the average level of GDP per capita. We showed in section 2 that a higher average level of early development in a country was robustly correlated with higher current income. The explanation for this finding is that people whose ancestors were living in countries that developed earlier brought with them some advantage-such as human capital, knowledge, culture, or institutions-which raises the level of income in their country up until today.
Depending on what exact advantage is conferred by earlier development, there might also be implications for how the variance of early development among a country's contributing populations would affect output. For example, if early development conferred some cultural attribute that was good for growth, then in a population containing some people with a long history of development and some with a short history, this growth-promoting cultural trait might simply be transferred from the long history group to the short history group. Similarly, growth-promoting institutions brought along by people with a long history of development could be extended to benefit people with short histories of development. An obvious model for such transfer is language: in many parts of the world, descendents of people with short histories of development speak languages that come from Europe, which has a long history of development. If growth-promoting characteristics also transfer in this fashion, then a country with half its population coming from areas with high statehist and half from areas with low statehist might be richer than a country with the same average statehist but no heterogeneity.
The above logic would tend to predict that, holding average history of early development constant, a higher variance of early development would raise a country's level of income. However, there are channels that work in the opposite direction. As shown in the previous section, higher variance of early development predicts higher inequality. Inequality is often found to negatively impact growth (see, for example, Easterly 2007), and one could easily imagine that the inequality generated by heterogeneity in early development history would lead to the inefficient struggles over income redistribution or the creation of growth-impeding institutions. This is certainly the flavor of the story told by Sokoloff and Engermann (2000) . Similarly, the ethnic diversity that comes along with a population that is heterogeneous in its early development history could hinder the creation of growth-promoting institutions. In 1986, Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, commenting on the skills of the American labor force, said that "there are things the Americans have not been able to do because of multiple nationalities there … things are easier in Japan because we are a monoracial society."
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In Table 7 we present regressions of the log of current income per capita on the standard deviation of each of our three measures of early development (statehist, agyears, and source region coefficients), with and without controls for the mean of each of the variables as well as the current gini coefficient. Once the mean level of statehist is controlled for, the standard deviation of statehist has a positive and significant effect on current income. In the case of the regression using agyears the coefficient is similarly positive, but is only significant at the 7% level. Interestingly, the coefficient on the standard deviation of the source region coefficient is not significant at all once the mean of the source region coefficients is included.
Columns 3, 6, and 9 include the value of the gini coefficient on the right hand side of the regression. Obviously, since we just presented a series of regressions in which it was the dependent variable, we consider the gini coefficient to be endogenous. Nevertheless, controlling for the gini is a way to test the theory that one effect of heterogeneity in early development is to reduce current income by raising inequality. The gini coefficient enters the regressions that include either statehist or agyears negatively. More important, including the gini raises the coefficient on the standard deviation of either statehist or agyears (and makes the latter statistically significant). This is what we would expect in the case where one of the channels by which heterogeneity in development affected income was inequality. In the case of the regressions including the source region coefficients, the coefficient on gini is positive and significant, and adding the gini to the right hand side lowers the coefficient on the standard deviation of the source region coefficients.
The positive coefficients on the standard deviations of statehist and agyears imply, as discussed above, that a heterogeneous population will be better off than a homogeneous population with the same average level of early development. For example, using the coefficients in Column 2 of Table 7 , a country with a population composed of 50% people with a statehist of 0.4 and 50% with a statehist of 0.6 will be 25 percent richer than a homogenous country with statehist of 0.5. A country with 50% of the population having statehist of 1.0 and 50% with statehist of zero would be 3.1 times as rich as a homogenous country with the same average statehist. (This latter example is quite outside the range of the data, however. The highest values of the standard deviation of statehist in our data set are Fiji (0.346), Cape Verde (0.294) and Guyana (0.293). In the example, the standard deviation is 0.5).
The coefficients also have the unpalatable property that a country's predicted income can sometimes be raised by replacing high statehist people with low statehist people, since the decline in the average level of statehist will be more than balanced by the increase in the standard deviation. For example, the coefficients just discussed imply that combining populations with statehist of 1 and 0, the optimal mix is 83% statehist=1 and 17% statehist=0. A country with such a mix would be 66% richer than a country with 100% of the population having a statehist of 1.
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One explanation for this somewhat counterintuitive finding is that during the long era of European expansion spanning the 15 th to early 20 th centuries, European-settled countries like the United States, Chile, Mexico and Brazil having substantial African and/or Amerindian minorities attained considerably higher incomes than many homogenously populated Asian countries with relatively long state histories, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and China. Chanda and Putterman (2007) argue that the underperformance of the latter group of countries during the 1500 -1960 period is an exception to the rule (which they find to have held up to 1500 and again since 1960) that earlier development of agriculture and states has been associated with greater economic development during most of world history. While our regression result reflects the fact that population heterogeneity has not detracted from economic development in the first group of countries, it may be well to treat it as a by-product of specific historical contingencies, and not to infer from it that "catch up" by the latter countries would be speeded up by infusions of low statehist populations into existing high statehist countries.
Conclusion
Conquest, colonialism, migration, slavery, and epidemic disease reshaped the world that existed before the era of European expansion. Over the last 500 years, there have been dramatic movements of people, institutions, cultures, and languages among the world's major regions. These movements clearly have implications for the course of economic development. Existing literature has already made a good start at examining how institutions were transferred between regions and the long lasting economic effects of these transfers. However the human side of the story -the relationship between where the ancestors of a country's current population lived and current outcomes -has received relatively little attention, in part due to the absence of suitable data. In this paper, we introduce a "world migration matrix" to account for international movements of people since the year 1500. We use the matrix to document some major features of world migration history such as the bi-modality of the distribution of indigenous and nonindigenous people by country and the variations in the primary source regions for immigrant-populated countries.
In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate the utility of the migration data by using it to re-visit the hypothesis that early development of agrarian societies and their sociopolitical correlates-states-conferred developmental advantages that remain relevant today. We confirm that in a global sample, countries on whose territories agriculture and states developed earlier have higher incomes. But we conjecture that people who moved from one region to another carried the human capabilities built up in that area with them. We find that re-calculating state history and agriculture measures for each country as weighted averages by place of origin of their people's ancestors considerably improved the fit of these regressions.
In Part 3, we show that the heterogeneity of a country's population in terms of the early development of its ancestors as of 1500 was strongly correlated with income inequality. We also show that heterogeneity with respect to country of ancestry or with respect to the ancestral language does a better job than does current linguistic or ethnic heterogeneity in predicting income inequalities today. As an additional test of the theory that early development conferred lasting advantage, we show that the rankings of ethnic or racial groups within a country's income distribution are strongly correlated with the average levels of groups' early development indicators. Finally, in Part 4, we find that heterogeneity of early development, holding the mean level constant, is associated with higher, per capita income. We interpret this finding as indicating that the effect of spillovers of growth-promoting characteristics between groups having different early development histories more than compensated for any negative effect on growth of higher inequality due to heterogeneity.
The overall finding of our paper is that the origins of a country's populationmore specifically, where the ancestors of the current population lived some 500 years ago -matters for economic outcomes today. Having ancestors who lived in places with early agricultural and political development is good for income today, both at the level of country averages and in terms of an individual's position within a country's income distribution. Exactly why the origins of the current population matter is a question on which we can only speculate at this point. People who moved across borders brought with them human capital, cultures, genes, institutions, and languages. People who came from areas which developed early evidently brought with them versions of one or more of these things that were conducive to higher income. Future research will have to sort out which ones were the most significant. The fact that early development explains an ethnic group's position within a country's income distribution suggests that "good institutions" coming from regions of early development cannot be the whole story, although it does not prove that institutions are not of enormous importance. More research is also needed to understand how early development led to the creation of growth promoting characteristics (whatever these turn out to be) as well as the process by which these characteristics are transferred between populations of high and low early development. Our hope is that the availability of a compilation of data on the reconfiguration of country populations since 1500 will make it easier to address such issues in future research. omitted region in all regressions. In regression 1, the independent variables are the shares of the population in each country originating in each region. In regression 2, the independent variables are dummies for a country being located in a particular region. In regression 3 the independent variables are both of the above. ancestors from own or immediate neighboring country.
Because our interest is in the possible impact of its people's origins on each country's economic performance, we try to identify the origins of long-term residents only, thus leaving out guest or temporary workers. Very little data is available about the duration of stay of most temporary workers, so we made educated guesses as to what portion of the originally temporary residents have become permanent.
The matrix includes entries on all countries existing in 2000 having populations of one half million or larger. A country is included as a source country for ancestors of the people of another country if at least 0.5% of all ancestors alive in 1500 are estimated to have lived there. Some entries smaller than 0.5% are found in the matrix, but these occur as a result of special decompositions applied to populations that our sources identify by ethnic group rather than by country of origin-e.g. Gypsies, Africans (descended from slaves, especially in the Americas), and Ashkenazi Jews. The full appendix details the method of assigning fractions of these populations to individual source countries.
Some of the more important sources from which data were drawn for the construction of the matrix are listed below. See the full appendix and region notes for other sources and details. 
